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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract containing a provision
that "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agree-
ment... shall be settled by arbitration." A dispute arose and defen-
dant demanded arbitration. Plaintiff brought an action in federal dis-
trict court to rescind the contract on the ground of fraudulent induce-
ment, moving to stay arbitration. Defendant cross-moved to stay trial
pending arbitration. The district court granted defendant's motion
and denied plaintiff's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Unless there is an allegation that the arbitration provision itself
was fraudulently induced, an issue of fraudulent inducement of a
contract containing an arbitration provision must be arbitrated even
if the relief sought is rescission. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 202
(1966).
New York, in 1920, and Congress, in 1925, passed statutes1 which
abrogated the common law rule that executory arbitration agreements
were not specifically enforceable.' Under those statutes, which have
been the pattern for similar legislation in other jurisdictions,' written
L9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1965); N.Y. Civ. PaRC. LAW §§7501-14 (McKinney 1963).
'Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1957);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 550 and comment (1932).
'E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.010-220 (1956), which provides that agreements to
submit existing controversies to arbitration and provisions in written agreements
providing for arbitration of future disputes arising out of or in relation to the
agreement are "valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist in
law or equity for the revocation of any agreement." WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.010
(1956). If any party to a written arbitration agreement institutes any legal or
equitable action which involves an issue referable to arbitration under the terms of
the agreement, any other party to the arbitration agreement may move for a stay of
the action pending arbitration. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.030 (1956). Upon a motion
to compel arbitration, a court may order a party to comply with an arbitration
agreement if the dispute is referable to arbitration under the terms of the agreement
and if there is no "substantial issue . . . as to the existence or validity" of the
arbitration agreement. If there is a substantial issue as to the existence or validity
of the arbitration agreement or as to a failure to comply with such an agreement, a
trial will be held as to those issues, and either party may demand a jury. Questions
of existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or failure to comply therewith
can be raised only by (1) pleading evidentiary facts raising the issues and (2)
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arbitration provisions are enforceable' and judicial proceedings may
be stayed pending arbitration.5 Before a court may compel arbitration,
however, it must find that the parties did agree to arbitrate and that
the dispute is within the terms of the agreement.' One of the more
troublesome questions arising under these statutes is whether specific
enforcement of an arbitration provision shall be granted if rescission
of a contract containing an arbitration clause is sought on the ground
of fraudulent inducement.7 It can be argued that in such a case the
allegation of fraud raises the non-arbitrable issue of whether there
exists an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
In the principal case, plaintiff contended that the arbitration provi-
sion was a part of the contract to be rescinded, and, therefore, the
existence of the provision was in issue. The court determined that
under federal law an arbitration provision is separable from the "prin-
cipal contract" containing it, and an allegation of fraudulent induce-
ment of the principal contract does not reach the arbitration provision,
citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., The second
moving to stay arbitration or contesting a motion to compel arbitration. WASH.
REv. CODE § 7.04.040 (1956).
Other sections of the Washington statute deal with representation by counsel at
arbitration hearings, provisions for compelling witness attendance at arbitration
hearings, confirmation of an arbitration award, and vacation, modification, or correc-
tion of an award and the grounds therefor.
'9 U.S.C. § 2 (1965) ; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1963). The federal
statute provides:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
This language, with the exception of the commerce qualification, was copied from
the former New York statute, originally enacted in 1920. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920,
ch. 275, § 2.
The New York statute was amended and renumbered in 1963 and now provides that
"a written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising ... to arbitration
is enforceable .... " The reviser's notes indicate that the words "valid, irrevocable"
and the saving clause were regarded as unnecessary. Thus the change in language
was not intended to alter the statutory effect.
Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.010 (1956), supra note 3.
'9 U.S.C. §3 (1965); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §7503(a) (McKinney 1963). See
also WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.030 (1956).
69 U.S.C. § 4 (1965); N.Y. Civ. PaAc. LAW § 7503(a) (McKinney 1963). The
federal statute provides that:
[U]pon being satisfied that the naking of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. [Emphasis added.]
Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.040 (1956) which requires that there be "no
substantial issue ... as to the existence or validity of the agreement to arbitrate...."
(Emphasis added.)
See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 936 (1963).
8271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), dismnissed per
stipulation of parties, 364 U.S. 801 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Robert Lawrence].
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circuit in Robert Lawrence had reasoned that policy considerations
and the language of the federal statute9 required a holding that an
arbitration clause is separable.10 The policy considerations deemed
controlling were: (1) parties should be free to agree that fraudulent
inducement should be arbitrated; (2) arbitrability should not depend
on the words used in pleading a claim; 1 (3) courts should not encour-
age delay of arbitration; and (4) maximum effect should be given to
the legislatively announced policy in favor of arbitration. Plaintiff in
the principal case attempted to distinguish Robert Lawrence on the
ground that claimant there sought damages, affirming the contract,
whereas plaintiff in the principal case sought rescission, putting the
contract's existence in issue. Without discussion, the court held that
the relief sought had no bearing on the separability of an arbitration
provision or the arbitrability of an issue of fraudulent inducement of
the principal contract.'"
09 U.S.C. §2 (1965). See note 4 supra.
The court argued that the statute "envisages a distinction between the entire con-
tract on the one hand and the arbitration clause of the contract on the other" because
the statute deals only with arbitration clauses and not with contracts as a whole.
271 F.2d at 409. This seems unlikely since the only purpose of the statute was to
validate arbitration agreements. Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455,
457 (10th Cir. 1957); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). Arbitration
clauses were singled out because they need special statutory treatment which contracts
and other contract clauses do not need. They were not singled out with the purpose of
making arbitration clauses separate from contracts.
" The doctrine of separability was qualified in El Hoss Eng'r & Transp. Co. v.
American Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837(1961). The court held that where express conditions precedent to the existence of a
contract are made applicable to the arbitration provision, an issue of satisfaction of
the conditions is a question for the court. Although the court reasoned that the par-
ties had manifested an intent to treat the arbitration clause as inseparable from the
principal contract, the decision may also be explained on the ground that until the
conditions are satisfied there is no arbitration agreement. Eastern Marine Corp. v.
Fukaya Trading Co., 364 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1966) ; cf. lt re Kinoshita & Co.,
287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961) (dictum that an arbitration clause is not "separable"
if "there had at no time existed ... any contractual relation"). El Hoss may stand for
the proposition that separability of an arbitration clause depends on the particular
facts of each case and is not a rule of law. See Note, 3 B.C. IN. & Com. L. REv.
85, 88 (1961).
The basic doctrine of separability of arbitration clauses was adopted in Electronic
& Missile Facilities, Inc. v. Moseley, 306 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 374 U.S. 167 (1963). But see Eastern Marine Corp. v. Fukaya Trading
Co., sutepra at 83 (dictum). The doctrine was approved in Lummus v. Commonwealth
Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).1Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 410. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a con-
tract whereby defendant promised to deliver goods to plaintiff by a certain date. The
goods were delivered late. Plaintiff alleged that he would not have entered into the
contract had he known that defendant never intended to deliver the goods on the ap-
pointed date. The court found that it was difficult to tell whether plaintiff was com-
plaining of a failure of performance or fraud in the inducement. It may be that
plaintiff alleged fraudulent inducement, rather than breach, to avoid arbitration,
especially when it is considered that he kept the goods and sought damages rather
than rescission.
"Consistency between the holding in the principal case and the opinion in
1967]
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The precise holding of the principal case was that a complainant
must allege fraudulent inducement of the arbitration provision itself
before he may avoid his promise to arbitrate on the ground of fraud.
The court failed, however, to discuss adequately the substantive impli-
cations of its procedural holding. Assume that there is an allegation
that the arbitration provision was itself fraudulently induced. The
rule as announced in the principal case may mean that the allegation
completely ousts the arbitrator of his jurisdiction, leaving the court
as the proper body to determine all issues of fraudulent inducement,
both as to the arbitration provision and as to the principal contract.
Because this interpretation of the holding is inconsistent with the
policy against having the outcome of litigation determined by plead-
ings,13 the policy favoring arbitration, and the statute limiting the
court's jurisdiction to determining whether an arbitration agreement
exists,14 it appears incorrect. The court's judgment must, therefore,
be limited to a determination of whether the arbitration provision was
fraudulently induced.
Uncertainty remains as to what kinds of issues raised by allegations
of fraudulent inducement of an arbitration provision a court will decide
under the Second Circuit rule. A complainant might allege a fraud as to
an arbitration provision which is separate from the fraud which alleg-
edly induced the principal contract. Thus, it might be alleged that
defendant represented to complainant that X would be an unbiased
arbitrator, whereas, unknown to complainant, X is the defendant's
brother. Clearly a court would decide the issues raised by such an
allegation.' 5
Robert Lawrence is demonstrated by this statement from Robert Lazw'rcnce, 271 F.2d
at 411:
And we would suppose that generally where the arbitration provision of the
contract is sufficiently broad to encompass the issue of fraud, the mutual promises
to arbitrate would form the quid pro quo of one another and constitute a sep-
arable and enforceable part of the agreement. We do not decide this point, how-
ever, as it is not necessarily before us.
Victory v. Manning, 128 F2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Laverett v. Continental
Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), where the court stated: "only
too frequently in the past have procedural rules been regarded as ends in themselves
upon whose rigid altar has ultimate justice been sacrificed."
149 U.S.C. §4 (1965). See also WAsHi. REV. CODE §7.04.040 (1) (1956); N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. LAw § 7503(a) (McKinney 1963).
" The following kinds of allegations might also be in this "separate fraud"
category:
(1) Defendant represented to claimant that X was an expert on the textile indus-
try, whereas, unknown to claimant, X is an attorney and knows nothing about the
textile industry.(2) The arbitration clause was in extremely fine print and was hidden on the
back of defendant's printed form among fifteen other clauses in similar fine print.
[ VOL. 42: 621
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A complainant might also allege that insertion of an arbitration
provision was part of a larger fraudulent scheme. Such an overall
scheme might include a plan whereby the wrongdoer intended to bind
a party residing in one state to arbitration in a different state and
deliberately to make unreasonable demands, hoping that extra expenses
and inconvenience would induce the other party to yield to the wrong-
doer's demands without resistance. It has been held that such an
allegation would charge fraud as to the arbitration provision itself and
that the court must pass on the issues raised before arbitration may
be compelled. 16
Probably the most common allegation would be that the same fraud
inducing the principal contract also induced the arbitration provision.
It might be argued that the complainant would never have entered
into the contract had the defendant not made certain false representa-
tions.17 If a court entertained such an allegation and found no fraud,
then an order to arbitrate the issue of fraud as to the principal contract
would follow since the court's jurisdiction is limited to deciding whe-
ther an agreement to arbitrate exists. But the issues before the arbi-
trator would be the same as those previously decided by the court.
Such a procedure would involve wasteful and time-consuming duplica-
tion of effort and would afford a complainant two "days in court" on
the same issues. For these reasons a court should refuse to entertain
an allegation that fraud induced the arbitration provision if the fraud
alleged is not distinct from that claimed to have induced the principal
contract.
Thus, the Second Circuit rule may be reduced to the following: an
issue of fraudulent inducement of a contract containing an arbitration
provision must be arbitrated, even if rescission is sought, unless (a) the
arbitration provision was itself fraudulently induced by a "separate
fraud" (a fraud running only to the arbitration provision) or (b) inser-
tion of the arbitration provision was part of an overall scheme to
defraud. This rule depends upon adoption by the Second Circuit of
the doctrine that an arbitration provision is separable from the princi-
pal contract. If an arbitration provision is not separable and rescission
(3) Defendant, subcontractor, represented to claimant, materialman, that defen-
dant's contract with P, general contractor, obligated defendant to insert arbitration
clauses in defendant's contracts, whereas, unknown to claimant, defendant was under
no such obligation.
" Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963), reversing
306 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1962). For a detailed description of the alleged scheme, see
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-12. The court neither passed on nor discussed the merits
of the Second Circuit rule, which purportedly was applied by the Fifth Circuit.
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is sought, then the existence of an agreement to arbitrate is in issue
since an action for rescission reaches all parts of the contract.'" If the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate is in issue, then the making of
an agreement to arbitrate is in issue 0 in which case a court may not
compel arbitration. 0 Having established the Second Circuit rule, the
next question is whether that rule is preferable to an alternative rule
derived from a holding of non-separability.
Although the present state of its law is unclear,21 New York is the
only jurisdiction to formulate an alternative to the second circuit rule.
New York courts have held that fraudulent inducement is a question
for the court if plaintiff seeks rescission22 but is arbitrable if damages
17 In the principal case it was alleged that defendant's business, which plaintiff
had contracted to purchase, was nearly bankrupt when the contract was executed and
defendant had not disclosed this fact to plaintiff. Plaintiff might never have entered
into the contract had he known of the business' financial condition and, therefore,
would never have agreed to arbitrate. Arguably, therefore, the same fraud that in-
duced the principal contract also induced the arbitration provision.IS RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs § 487 (1932).
"Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 202 (1966); it re Cheney Bros., 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N.Y.
Supp. 96 (1st Dept., 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 245 N.Y. 375, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
Contra, Lipman v. lHaeuser Shellac Co., 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1942).
9 U.S.C. §4 (1965). See also WASH. REv. CODE §7.04.040(1) (1956); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7503 (a) (McKinney 1963).
'In re Cheney Bros., 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N.Y. Supp. 96 (1st Dept. 1926),
revd on other grounds, 245 N.Y. 375, 157 N.E. 272 (1927), held that if plaintiff seeks
rescission, an issue of fraudulent inducement of a contract is a question for the court.
Subsequent decisions have held that if plaintiff in any way affirmed the contract, an
issue of fraudulent inducement is a question for the arbitrator. See, e.g., Amerotron
Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1957)(plaintiff sought damages); Milton L. Ehrlich, Inc. v. Swiss Constr. Corp., 21
Misc. 2d 506, 197 N.Y.S2d 668 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term), modified on other grounds,
11 App. Div. 2d 644, 201 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1st Dept. 1960) (plaintiff attempted to re-
scind after participating in the selection of arbitrators) ; Stupell v. Laver, 195 Misc.
177, 89 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1949) (after learning of the fraud,
plaintiff made conditional offer to perform but subsequently sought rescission).
It has also been held that all issues arising out of conduct subsequent to the making
of a contract are for the arbitrator although mutual rescission is alleged. Lipman v.
Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942). And, in Exercycle Corp.
v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1961), arbitra-
tion was required although the contract was allegedly void for lack of mutuality, the
court broadly stating:
Once it be ascertained that the parties broadly agreed to arbitrate a dispute
"arising out of or in connection with" the agreement, it is for the arbitrators to
decide what the agreement means and to enforce it according to the rules of law
which they deem appropriate ....
Both Lipman and Exercycle contained dicta to the effect that arbitration would
not have been ordered had plaintiff sought rescission for fraud. That result is based
on the premises that an arbitration provision is not separable from the contract and
that an existing arbitration agreement is a condition precedent to the arbitrator'sjurisdiction. Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382,
171 N.E. 579, 581, 583 (1930). However, in Lipman, supra at 819, the court stated:
"[C]ontrary to the contention of appellant, the statute only requires the contract to have
been made and does not require that it shall continue to be in existence." Further-
more, both the Lipman and Exercycle holdings undercut the nonseparability rationale
[ VOL. 42: 621
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are sought.23 The courts reasoned from an unexplained determination
that arbitration provisions are not separable from the underlying con-
tracts..2 4 From this premise it was concluded that if a plaintiff seeks
rescission and fraud is proved, the arbitration provision will fall with
the contract, 25 ousting the arbitrator of jurisdiction. 20 If a plaintiff
despite its prior approval in In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d
493, 496 (1942). If a contract is rescinded, or is void, and the arbitration provision
is not separable, then under contract law there is no enforceable agreement to
arbitrate. 6A CoRniN, CoNTRAcTs § 1444A, at 465 (1962) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS
§§ 406, 122, comment b (1932) ; cf. Sanchez v. Crandon Wholesale Drug Co., 173 So.
2d 687 (Fla. 1965). Therefore, a holding that arbitration is required under such
circumstances necessarily implies that the agreement to arbitrate is not part of the
rescinded or void contract. See Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d
463, 468, 469, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 360, 361 (1961) (concurring opinion of Froessel, J.;
dissenting opinion of Dye, J.); 75 HARy. L. REv. 835 (1962); 110 U. PA. L. REv.
113 (1961).
In the most recent case on the question it was held that an issue of fraudulent in-
ducement is one for the arbitrator even if rescission is sought. In re Amphenol
Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 46, 266 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1965), aff'd without
opinion, 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div., 1966). Cf. Fabrex Corp. v. Winard Sales
Co., 23 Misc. 2d 26, 200 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1960) (arbitration
ordered upon court's finding that the fraud alleged was fraud in performance not
fraud in inducement). The Anpheinol court may have been influenced by a peculiar
circumstance. It was the defrauded party who was attempting to enforce arbitration.
Cf. Milton L. Ehrlich v. Swiss Constr. Co., supra. The only reason given for the
decision in Amphenol was that the terms of the arbitration provision were sufficiently
broad to include a dispute over fraudulent inducement.
'E.g., Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d
353 (1961) (dictum); Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d
366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957) ; In re Cheney Bros., 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N.Y. Supp.
96 (1926), rev'd on other grounds, 245 N.Y. 375, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
' See, e.g.. Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick, supra note 22; Amerotron Corp.
v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dept.
1957).
' "If the contract was voided by fraud the arbitration provision therein falls."
In re Cheney Bros., 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N.Y. Supp. 96, 96 (1926), rev'd o other
grounds, 245 N.Y. 375, 157 N.E. 272 (1927): Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Gold-
berg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579, 583 (1930) ; ef. In re Kramer &
Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493, 496 (1942).
One court, without discussing separability, argued that fraud, duress and usury
(labelled as issues of "public policy voidability") should not be arbitrable, whereas
issues of consideration, mutuality, and assent (labelled as issues of "common law
invalidity") are arbitrable. Durst v. Abrash, 22 App. Div. 2d 39, 253 N.Y.S.2d 351
(1964), aff'd without opinion, 17 N.Y. 2d 445, 213 N.E.2d 887, 266 N.Y.S.2d 806
(1965). The court reasoned that the judiciary should not lose control over questions
of "public policy." The chief difficulty with this rationale is that, faced with any
allegation, a court has jurisdiction only to consider whether there is an agreement to
arbitrate and whether the dispute is within the terms of the agreement. N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 7503 (a) (McKinney 1963). Moreover, the statute does not indicate that
the courts were intended to retain jurisdiction over questions of "public policy,"
even when reviewing arbitrators' decisions. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7509-11 (Mc-
Kinney 1963). See also 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1965) ; WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 7.04.150-.170
(1956). Furthermore, once a clearly defined public policy has been established, its
application by an arbitrator should present no new difficulties and create no greater
problems than those found in issues of lack of consideration or mutuality.
' See, e.g., It re Cheney Bros., supra note 24; In re Grossman, 203 N.Y.S.2d 393,
396 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1959).
- See, e.g., In re Grossman, supra note 25; Royal Hair Pin Corp. v. Rieser Co.,
15 App. Div. 2d 539, 222 N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d Dept. 1961).
19671]
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seeks damages, however, he necessarily affirms the contract, 7 including
the arbitration provision, and no dispute exists over the validity of the
agreement to arbitrate.28 This reasoning was expressly rejected in the
principal case and appears questionable even in New York.2"
Two arguments are advanced in support of New York's holding of
non-separability.30 First, it is contended that because businessmen
bargain primarily over price, quality, and quantity (all noncommercial
terms usually incorporated in a printed form), the other terms, includ-
ing arbitration provisions, are not intended to be binding if the com-
See, e.g., Amerotron Corp. v. Maxvell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App. Div. 2d
899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dept. 1957) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 484 and illustra-
tion 5 (1932).
' The New York rule has been followed by Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson,
206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953), and Murphey v. Morris,
12 N.J. Super. 544, 80 A2d 128 (1951). It was approved in Reynolds Jamaica Mines,
Ltd. v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 239 F2d 689 (4th Cir. 1956), and Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir. 1942) (over-
ruled by Robert Lawrence).
Compare McElwee-Courbis Constr. Co. v. Rife, 133 F. Supp. 790, 793 (M.D.Pa.
1955), compelling arbitration on the grounds that the affidavits were insufficient to
establish fraudulent inducement. The court decided that one could not avoid arbitra-
tion merely by "glibly" charging fraud but reserved the right to grant the allegedly
defrauded party appropriate relief if the hearings before the arbitrator established
fraud. This is a rather strange combination of the second circuit and New York
rules. The result is to allow an arbitrator to take evidence of fraud without giving
him jurisdiction to decide the fraud issue. The court would apparently decide the
issue after the arbitration hearings were completed. It was not clear from the
court's opinion whether a trial de novo would be granted. If not, the procedure is
unsatisfactory because crucial fact determinations may turn on the credibility of the
witnesses. If a trial de novo is granted the procedure is unsatisfactory because of
delay and duplication of effort.
= See note 21 supra.
' Neither of these arguments have received the approval of the New York judici-
ary. The New York courts have never adequately explained the reasons for their
determination of nonseparability.
One possible explanation can be found in an analysis of the New York statute as
it was first enacted. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, ch. 275, § 2 provided:
A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration ... , or a submission
... of an existing controversy to arbitration, shall be valid, enforcible [sic] and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract. [Emphasis added.]
And N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, ch. 275, § 3 provided:
[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the contract or submission ... is not in
issue, the court ... shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbi-
tration in accordance with the terms of the contract or submission. [Emphasis
added.]
Thus, it may be argued that the "contract" referred to in § 3 is the same "contract"
referred to in § 2. For this reason, a court is required to determine the existence of
the entire contract.
While this construction could explain the earlier New York determinations of
nonseparability, it can no longer be made because the 1963 amendment eliminates any
distinction between arbitration provisions and contracts. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW §
7501 (McKinney 1963) provides: "A written agreement to submit any controversy
thereafter arising or any existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable ... .
An argument similar to the one made above may be made with respect to the
Washington statute. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.010 (1956) provides:
[ VOL. 42: 621
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mercial bargain is not.31 But to say that bargaining relates primarily
to other terms is an admission that businessmen have no actual intent
as to the separability of an arbitration provision. The "intent" as-
cribed to them is a fiction based on conjecture as to what they would
have intended had they thought about the question. Second, it is
contended that if fraud permeates a contract to the extent that the
injured party would not have entered it had he known of the fraud,
then there is no intention to be bound by any part of that contract.
Thus, enforcement of the arbitration clause would require an unwar-
ranted assumption that there would have been a contract even if the
injured party had known of the fraud.32 However, regardless of the
injured party's knowledge of the fraud, his original actual intent was
to enter into a contract and to arbitrate disputes concerning the con-
tractual relationship, which would include a claim of right to rescind.
It does not seem unfair nor unsound to compel arbitration when there
is such an actual intent.
The Second Circuit has contended, 3 and some commentators agree,
3 4
that fraudulent inducement should be arbitrated because public policy
favors arbitration due to its speed, economy, and ability to relieve court
congestion and the general expertise of the arbitrators. 35 This public
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration ... any
controversy ... existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit,
or they may include in a written agreement a provision to settle by arbitration
any controversy thereafter arising between them out of or in relation to such
agreement. Such agreement shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon
such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revocation of any agreement.
[Emphasis added.]
And, WAsH. REv. CODE § 6.04.040(1) (1956) provides:
If the court is satisfied ... that no substantial issue exists as to the existence or
validity of the agreement to arbitrate ... the court shall make an order directing
the parties to proceed to arbitrate in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
[Emphasis added.]
The argument which leads to nonseparability is that agreenent to arbitrate in
§7.04.040(1) means agreement to submit and agreement containing an arbitration
provision. Thus, if the existence of an agreement containing an arbitration clause is
in issue, arbitration may not be ordered.
Section 7.04.040(1), however, refers to an agreement to arbitrate, a more narrow
term than agreement as expressed in § 7.04.010. For this reason it could be argued
that § 7.04.040(1) requires the court to determine the validity only of the arbitration
"provision" and not the entire agreement mentioned in § 7.04.010.
' See 46 VA. L. REv. 340, 343 (1960) ; cf. Comment, The Arbitrable Issue: The
Problem of Fraud, 28 FoRDHAm L. REv. 802, 807 (1960).
' See Comment, Judicial Control of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: A Changhig
Attitude, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 521, 531 (1963) ; but cf. 45 CORNELL L.Q. 795, 801 (1960).
Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 410.
e Nausbaurr, The "Separability Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration,
17 N.Y.U.L. REv. 609 (1940) ; Parsell, Arbitration of Fraud in the Inducement of a
Contract, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1927) ; Comment, Fraudulent Inducement as a De-fense to the Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 36 YALE L.J. 866 (1927).
n See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
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policy is then taken to justify a rule of separability. It is also suggested
that a person who has agreed to arbitrate should not be allowed to
complain when the arbitration process is invoked by the other party."
However, to say that arbitration is valuable, or that arbitration agree-
ments should be enforced, leaves unanswered the underlying issue of
what circumstances justify rescission of an arbitration agreement.
This issue must be resolved before a choice between separability or
nonseparability becomes necessary. Separability is only a means to an
end and need not be considered until the desired end has been deter-
mined.
The basic question is whether a complainant should be allowed to
avoid his promise to arbitrate because of the same circumstances
which allow him to avoid his substantive or "principal" promises. If
this question is answered in the affirmative, then a court will hold the
arbitration provision not separable, find that there is an issue as to
the making of an agreement to arbitrate, if rescission is sought, on that
ground refuse to compel arbitration, and proceed to decide the issue
of fraud as to the whole contract. If the question is answered in the
negative, then a court will hold the arbitration provision separable
and proceed in a manner opposite from that outlined above. One
commentator, 37 answering the question in the affirmative, contends
that though there may be more than one promise, there was only one
bargaining transaction and an assent to all the terms involved only
one mental calculation; therefore, any fraud inducing this assent is a
fraud as to all the terms, including arbitration clauses. However, other
considerations are relevant. First, from the promisor's point of view, a
promise to arbitrate involves considerations different from those atten-
dant on promises made in the principal contract. Whether a person
will promise to arbitrate will depend on his attitude toward the desir-
ability of arbitration as a dispute resolution technique, whereas a
promise to buy, sell, manage, or whatever, will typically depend on
considerations of personal gain. Fraud inducing a person to promise
to buy in no way misleads the defrauded party as to the desirability
of arbitration, and, therefore, enforcing an arbitration clause would
not contradict his intent even if avoidance of the promise to buy is
sought. Second, a rule that an arbitration clause may be avoided on
the ground of fraud only if the clause was itself fraudulently induced
" See Comment, The Arbitrable Issue: The Problem of Fraud, 28 FoPnHAM L.
REv. 802, 808 (1960).
' 6A Co1BiN, CoNmAcTs § 1444, at 449 (1962).
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would afford ample protection against being forced into unintended
arbitration. Third, assuming that the defrauded party has a valid
claim of a right to rescind the principal contract and that the arbitrator
is competent, it should make no difference if the dispute is resolved
by arbitration rather than by the judicial process unless the claimant
is forum-shopping or seeking a jury determination.18 The last three
considerations, combined with a public policy in favor of arbitration,
outweigh the single assent consideration and require a negative answer
to the basic question.
The Second Circuit has apparently chosen the better rule: arbitra-
tion provisions are separable and a claim of fraudulent inducement
of a contract containing an arbitration clause should be arbitrated
regardless of the relief sought unless the arbitration clause was itself
fraudulently induced or the arbitration clause was inserted as part of
an overall scheme to defraud.
FTC PRELIMINARY RELIEF POWERS UNDER SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Respondents Dean Foods Company and Bowman Dairy Company,
substantial competitors in the sale of packaged milk, planned to merge.
Dean was to purchase substantially all of Bowman's assets and Bow-
man was to cease doing business. The Federal Trade Commission,
after issuing a formal complaint under section 7 of the Clayton Act'
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,2 applied to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a preliminary injunction to main-
tain the status quo until the Commission could hold hearings to deter-
mine the legality of the merger. Dismissal of the Commission's petition
was appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed and held: The
FTC has the power to seek preliminary injunctions in the courts of
'At least one court has rejected what appeared to be a forum-shopping attempt.
Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 466-67, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353,
357-58 (1961) (contract allegedly void for lack of mutuality.) Plaintiff apparently
argued that because no court would enforce his promise to employ defendant for life,
no arbitrator should be given an opportunity to do so. The court rejected the con-
tention, reasoning that by agreeing to arbitrate, plaintiff had agreed to forgo courts
in favor of a private judge. By implication the court held that plaintiff had assumed
the risk that an arbitrator might resolve a dispute differently from a court.
S64 Stat. 1125 (1950), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
a38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1964).
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